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lN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LA WRENCF.J W. BROWN, 
Plai11tiff-Res pondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES FRED JOHNSON and 
HOYAL BAKING COMPANY, 




NATURE OF CASE 
Action hy plaintiff to recon'r damages for personal 
inj11riPs snstainPd in an automobile accident. 
Dl8POSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Thl· .inr:'• rdnrned a verdict of no cause of action 
in tlw first trial. 'fhe court, J ndge Marcellus K. Snow 
,:itting, g-rante<l plaintiff's motion for a new trial. In the 
o;1·1·ond trial, the jury returnPd an Prroneous verdict in 
favor ol' the plaintiff, which court, Judge Leonard W. 
Elton sitting, did not accept until reYised. Judgment was 
ttPntly PntPrPd on tlw re\·ised verdict of thP second 
.111r>- ancl tliP eonrt clPniPd defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEcAL 
Defendants pray for reversal of the judgment enter-
ed by the trial court on the second jury veraict anJ foi 
reinstatement of the judgment of no cause of action 
entered on the first jury verdict; or in the alternative, 
defendants pray that the case be remanded and the trial 
court ordered to grant defendants a new trial with direc-
tion that the issue of damages relating to possible futme 
surgery be eliminated from the jury's consideration. 
STATE.MEN'!' OF FACTS 
(The followin,r; statements of facts as to liability 111e 
from the first trial.) 
The collision out of which this action arises occmn·d 
January 11, 1968. Plaintiff was driving a Corvair auto-
mobile down Emigration Canyon. The defendant.Johnson 
was driving a step-van bread truck in the course of hio 
employment with the defendant Ro)·al Baking 
and had followed plaintiff's automobile for approxirnatt>ly 
one mile down the canyon before the accident occmred 
(R. 738). Mr. Johnson had plaintiff's automobile in \'iP\\ 
most of the time as both vehides were prnceeding dO\rn 
the canyon (R. 739), but the plaintiff ne\·er saw the 
bread truck at any time prior to the collision (R. 595). 
As the vehicles entered a straight section of road \Ylier1' 
passing was permitted (Exh. P-1), Mr .. Johnson started 
to pass plaintiff's automobile since there was no oncoming 
traffic approaching (R. 596). 'fhen• was no intenwetio11.' 
in the area, no automobiles ahead of plaintiff, or an.1· 
other circumstance, according to plaintiff, which would 
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J;a,·p indicated to anyone following the plaintiff that 
i1t might suddenly decelerate (R. 596). 
\flwn thP front of the bread truck was about even 
w1tlt the rt>ar of plaintiff's automobile, plaintiff applied 
his hrahs and sw<'rnd somewhat to the left (R. 740) . 
.\Ir. .Johnson then dPcided not to complete his pass be-
rnu:-:P he was afraid plaintiff might lose control of his 
antornohile and skid into tlw bread truck (R. 785). As 
li1· was gl'tting back into the right-hand lane, plaintiff 
applied hi:s hrakPs the second tirrw (R. 740) without sig-
nnling, (R. 601), and apparently without observing to the 
rear th rough his rear-view mirror (R. 595). 
l 'laintiff's decPIPration was abrupt enough to raise 
tlw rear Pnd of his automobile at least two and one-half 
ineltPs in order that the rear hmnper of the Corvair could 
c111t11· o\·er the front bumper of the bread truck (R. 702-
/0:l) and damage the right front fender of the truck 
nL01·c the bumper (R. 741). 
Plaintiff's d<.'cekration was made because of a small 
1111µ; walking· along the right side of the roadway (R. 596) 
\\l1i<'h nPYPr c-rossed tlw road or darted out in front of 
l1i111 lwforP he applied his brakt>s (R. 598). 
( Tlu· follo1ri11g statcn1e11t of fucts regardi11g the is-
·11 s of i11jury owl donl((qes ure from tlil' seco11d trial.) 
As a n•snlt of tlH' areident, plaintiff ;,;ustained Yari-
on:-: injuriPs to hi:o-; nPck for whirh ht> was treated h:-· Dr. 
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Thomas E. Soderberg. Plaintiff was also examined by 
Dr. John N. Henrie four months after the accident at 
the request of plaintiff's attorney (R. 434) and h>- Dr. 
Reed S. Clegg seventeen months after the acodPnt «n 
independent medical examiner appointed by the <'onrt (Pt. 
84-85). Dr. Henrie anticipated no l>Prmanent disabilii 1 
as a result of the accident at the time of his examination 
made four months after the accident (R. 440 & Exh. D-10) 
and Dr. Clegg at the time of his examination made 
seventeen months after the accident felt the healing 
process had been completed (R. 468) and that plaintiff 
could continue ·with his wrestling activities at the Uniwr-
sity of Utah, if he so desired (R. -±55). 
The only testimony presentf:"d at trial n•gan!ing 
whether or not plaintiff would requirP surgery in thr· 
future as a result of the accident in question was that of 
Dr. Soderberg when he testified that thPre was a cham·P 
that surgery would be required, but it ·was not likely. HP 
estimated that there was only about a 15% chance of 
surgery becoming necessary at some later date (R. 368) 
and, conversely, an 85% possibility that future surgery 
would not be necessary (R. 394). 
Defendants objected to the introduction of c>Yidrnc1• 
relative to the surgical procedure, period of hospitaliza-
tion and post operative care relative to a cervical fusion 
operation, but said objection was overrnled (R. :369-371). 
Defendants also requested by their requested jnry in-
struction No. 21 that the jury be instructed that 
could not award damages for possible future surgery 
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l'\]lPDsPs or disability resulting therefrom since there 
no medical evidence admitted during the trial upon 
whit •1 it could be found by a preponderance of the evi-
ilf'lltl' tliat such surgery would become necessary, but 
,;aid n·qnested instruction was refused (R. 211). Defend-
<1nts thereafter excepted to the court's failure to give de-
frndants requested instruction No. 21 (R. 499). 
(The following statement of facts regarding jnry 
ddiuerntio11s and t'erdicts is from the second trial.) 
'l'he court specifically instrncted the jury that if they 
found the issues of liability in favor of the plaintiff, the 
amonnt of special damages awarded could not exceed 
$J17.50 (R. 234). Neverthelt>ss, the jnry returnt>d a 
wrdiet of spt>cial damages of $10,000.00 and general dam-
Hf!'('C: of $1,700.00 (R. 503-504), making a total verdict 
of $11,700.00. The court declared the verdict erroneous 
IR. ;)02 & ;)13) and sPnt the jnry ont to re-deliberate "·ith 
thP additional instruction that they re-read the instruc-
pa:-·ing 1mrticular attention to the instructions re-
gardinµ: damages (R. 508). 
'J'lie .inr:-· rt>tired to re-deliberate at 4 :35 p.m. (R. 
and rPturned tlwir second wrdict into the courtroom 
at+ :4: l p.111. (R. 510). 'r11e second vt>rdict a"·arded special 
rlama!!\'" of $377 50 and o·pnpral dama<res of $11 322 50 
(l • h b ' • 
IR. :112), making a total wrdict of $11.700.00, tlw sanw 
<1111<nmt a,.; awarded h>· th• first verdict. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINT;FF 
A NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiff's motion for a 1ww trial following th .. firc;1 
trial was made solely upon the factual basis that the evi-
dence did not support the verdict of no cause of action 
returned in favor of defendants (R. 181). Plaintiff made 
no claim of legal error in the admission or rejeetion of 
evidence, in the giving of jury instructions, or in the ron-
duct of the court or counsel. 
The factual issues tried 111 this case 1d1dl11·r 
or not the defendant Johnson was 11 
or not plaintiff was contributorily nPgligent and whdlu•r 
or not the negligence of either was a proximate can;;e of 
the accident. This court has held that tlie 
determination of negligence, contributory nPglig-pnc·p and 
causation is the prerogatiYe of the jury. Si11glctoJ1 u. 
Alexander, ct al., 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 12G (1%7) 
and Corbridge vs. M. Morrin & Son, Inc., 19 
409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967). 
Defendants do not question the principl<> that 111otiom 
for new trials are addressed to the sound discrPtion of 
the trial court in order to preV('nt manif Pst 
should it occur, but contend that such diseretion should 
be exercised with restraint when the only g-roumls tlaiu1-
ed for a new trial is ''insufficiency of the PYiclencc·" on 
issues which are traditionally the prerogative of the jm: 
to determine. Certainly one who attacks a jun· verdirt 
with a claim that it should be set aside and a 1ww trial 
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'.'! :tnled should show some irregnlarity, indication nt' 
•i·.iwliee or some other fact which may have prevented 
tiw J1arti<'S from having a fair trial. Plaintiff alleges 
110 -ud1 fact in his motion for a new trial and defendants 
.. ontPnd that nonP is shm,-n in the record (R. 541-802). 
J)efrndants readily agrPe \\·itlt the principle set forth 
rn ff.111ru/(l rs. St. Marks Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 421 
/:)ii ( l9GI) that the trial judg<''s rok in overseeing 
tli1· procPss of trial h:• jur:< with respect to ruling on mo-
tions for a new trial goes beyond merely determining 
11lwtlwr or not the P\·idencP will or will not support tk, 
wnlic-t, lint in th<' of any other contention and 
\I iil'r" tlt<' Pvidencl· is ratlwr halanced on tlw is-
·s of 11PgligPnce and contributory negligence, as will 
111· 1-d"ern·d to hPreaftt'r, tlw eourt's discretion to grant 
:1 111·\\· trial should be exercised cautiously. Indeed, 
tl1 :-;tanclard as !:Wt forth in the Hyland case, supra, 
c!1onl(l lw follo\n'd: 
"( 'onsistPnt "·itlt tlH, pnrposP just discussed, 
,,·]1('JH'nr \\hat has transpired in the proceeding 
is so oHl'nsin' to tht• trial c-ourt's senSl' of jnstict' 
tliat hl' 1H'li1'ws thP dPsired object of affording 
tll<' part:es a fair trial has failed, he has hoth tlH' 
pn·rng·ati\«' and the duty to grant a 1ww trial." 
In th1' llylu!ld cas(', the plaintiff was seriously in-
.111r1·cl \\·Iii!(' lwing eathdNizPd hy an of dPIPndant 
l11'pital. Tlic'l'P \\·as no <1nestion of contributon· necrli-. b 
on tlie ]Jart of tl11' plaintiff, tli(' dd'endant al!O\n'd 
' I'< nntrai1wcl J)('l"son to 1wrfonn a rather :::;ophis-
t1'":lh·(l 1irnc·<'dm1', and tli<' orderly admitted inflatinO' the . ,..... 
l 111:11111 oi" tli·· eath<'tPr ohtaininp: urine as he knP\\-
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from instructions and previous experience should occ1.r 
when the catheter entered the bladder, which shoni<l fo.k 
place before the balloon was inflated. A verdict ot no 
cause of action on such facts is without question againBt 
the weight of the evidence and offensive to one's sen8e 
of justice. 
However, such is not the case in the present adion. 
The jury could well have found the defendant J olmBon 
acted as a reasonably prudent person in attempting to 
get back into the right-hand lam• when he saw plniu-
tiff's brake lights illuminate for some reason unknown 
to him and was afraid the plaintiff might skid into l1i111 
(R. 785). Like·wise, the jury could \Yell han fonnd tlll· 
plaintiff contributorily negligent in failing to k<'('JI a 
reasonable lookout to the rear and in snddPnly 
his speed without giving a signal of his intention to do :-:o. 
Although the canyon road was a winding road, the 
defendant Johnson was able to see plaintiff's automobile 
ahead of him most of the time as tlH'.V traveled do\\11 the 
canyon toge•ther for approximately one mile hdol'P the 
accident occurred (R. 739). The jury might Wl'li haw 
found that if plaintiff had glanced into his rear Yirw 
mirror ocasionally as he traversed that last milt> before 
the accident occurred, that at least on one occasion he 
would have seen defendant's bread truck and known that 
it was in the vicinity. plaintiff testified he m·1·er 
saw the truck at any time prior to the accident (R. 595), 
the jury may well have concluded that he did not look to 
the rear as often as he should haw during that last mil». 
This court has previously held it to be a jnr,v qu(';;tio11 
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rJ1<"tlt<·r or not a forward dri,·er is guilty of negligenc(· 
. 'ailing to observP traffic approaching from the rear. 
Hayr/!'11 rs. Cederlund, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P.2d 796 
( 19;):3). 
Also, Section 41-6-69( c), U.C.A., 1953, provides that: 
'"Ko person shall stop or suddenly decrease the 
:-;pl'Pd of a ,·ehicle without first giving an appro-
priate signal in tlw manner provided herein to 
the driwr of any vehicle immediat<:>ly to the rea1· 
\l'hPn there is opportunity to give such signal." 
Tlw trial court so instructed the jury (R. 152) and the 
j11r:-· ('Ould have found that plaintiff had time to at least 
flash !tis brake light:-; in adrnnC'f1 of his deceleration, 
11lii<'li ]Ip admittedly did not do (R. GOl). The only signal 
1:1· g·;m· was the illumination of his brake lights made 
t·m1h·mporaneou:-;l>· \\·ith his dl'cPleration, which is not 
an appropriatP signal of ont> 's intention to decelerate 
'inC'.P it gin's no advanced warning of the contemplated 
d1·et>l1·rntion. Unitcd States z:s. First Security Bank of 
I 111!1. 4:24 (10th Cir. 
a jnr>· or other trier of fact could rea-
liave found to thP contrar>· on all of the fore.going 
l'aet11al issues, hut since the verdict returned was in fayor 
11 1' thP dl'f Pndanb, the d<:>frndants wPre entitlPd to have 
tli 1• 1·,·idPm·p and inf<:>rPnces which could logically 
111 • drn\1 n tht>rdrom vit>\YPd in tlH· light most favorable 
!11 thP111 h:· the trial eourt in eonsidering whether or not 
1li 1·n· 1rns an insuffiei<>nc·y of tlH· eyideneP to sustain 
1!1 1• Hnh·t n•nd1Ted. In 8111itli rs. Gallegos, l(i Ftah 2d 
-rno ;)70 ( 1 !Hi;)) this Conrt reitPrated prin-
'''tiiP in :-:ta ting: 
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"It is elementary that where therl' is a <lio:p11t, 
in the l'Yi<lence, resolving thP co11fliet:,; is r,11 
the jury nn<ler its prProgatin' as tlw "xcl11c ,,, 
finder of the faets. lt is equally so because of tl11· 
,jnry's VPrdict in his favor, must ae<'<']Jt tli1> l'i' 
spondent J onPs' \"ersion of the l'ads and r<·Yi1·1 .. 
the eyidl·neP and all inferenc<>s to lH' dra\\11 
thPrefrom in tlH' light most J'anJralill' to lii111. 
Ha\·ing donP so, it ap1wars that tl1l'n' is a rearnll 
ahlt> basis thPrein upon \d1ieh tlw jlll':· l'<mld r1·-
main nnpersnadPd that rPspomll'llt .J mws fail-
<'d to pPrform his dnty in :·jpjding thP rigJtt Of 
wa:·, as WP hav<' diseussecl ht>rl'in. A<'<'onlingl.1, 
thl' trial eonrt \\·as \\'Pl! advised in n·j<·ding apjll'I 
!ant's contPntion that rPspondPnt .JonPs ,:honk! 
lw held o-uiltY of <'Ontrihnton· npo·li 0 ·l'n<·<· a,- a h • • h h 
rnattPr of law and 1m·sc•nt<'d thl' 
to tl1(' jnry for ddPnnination." 
t'vidPnce Yil'\\·Pd in the liglit f'ayoral1!1· to 
tlw ddendants is substantial and snffi<'il'llt to ;.:11"tarn 
the \·erdict of no causP of adion and sin('(' laek ol' surt'i-
was tlH' only gronnd clairnt>d h» tit(' plaintiff in 
}1is motion for a nPw trial, thP trial ('Olll't ahusl'd its lliscl"' 
tion in sPtting asidl\ tlH' wrdiet and granting" 11l'\\. trinl. 
'l'lw propt>r rnlP with l'<'SJH'<'t to how adiYl' a trial jt11lg1· 
shonld ht>comP in sPtting aside YPrdids and grant 111g 
JH'W trials is '""" statt>d h:-· .Justie<' Crn<'kdt in his c1111-
<·urring opinion in l lollll I'S I"S. Xcl.w!ll, 7 r ta h :!d 
P.2d 722 (19fi8) as follows: 
"rrhe \"Pnlid, wh<'ll supportPd l1:-- s1tllsta11tinl 
evidence, should lw n'gardl'd as Jll'l's\1111ptinl"' 
eonect and should not IH' int\'rft>rn·d \1·ith 11wn 11 
hPcansp thP jndgl' might disap,-l'l'<' "·ith tll<' 
'T'lw JH'ProgatiY<' sl1onld onl:-· h<' <'XPl'<'i:'<'d "ll<'n, 
in vie\\· of thP trial <'Onrt, it S<'<'tlls ell'ar tlint tl!I' 
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j11n· has misappliPd or failed to talrn into accollnt 
11rnvPn facts; or mistmd<'n..;tood or disregarded 
thP law; or mad.- findings el early against tht· 
weigl1t of tl1<' p\·idenc<· so that the verdict i:-; of-
J'ensiYe to his sl'nsp of justice to the extent that 
Ii<> eannot in good C'onscienC'<' permit it to stand." 
Tl1i:-; ml(• \\·a:-; lakr adoptt-d h;; the (•ntin• court in the case 
of H'1'1!111011 rs. Xo/Jlc, 12 l'tah :2d '.)30, '.)(j(j P.:Zd 701 
"·l1<·rPin tlw eonrt stat<-d with res1>ect to the grant-
inµ: or new trials 'dwn tlwre has been substantial evidence 
i11trocl11<'\-'d "·hi<'h would sup1>ort the verdict: 
''Such action is warranted only when to the trial 
jndgl', it s<·1·ms elear that tl1<' jur:,r has misappliPd 
or fai kd to take into aecount pron•n facts; or 
mis11rnll·rstood or disn·gankd the law; or mach.• 
findings c·l<•arl,\· against the \\'Pight of the eYi-
dPne<'. ., 
:\1·\\· trials \\'('!'<' granted in both tlw J!ol111rs and 
ff, 111111111 (·asps; hut in tlw Holmes case, plaintiff "·as a 
till'('(' and one-lialf .\·Par ol<l ehild (too :';oung to he con-
trilllltoril,\· negligent) who ran into tht• street and was 
h,\' dPfrndant aft<•r the> latt<•r had h<·Pn 'rnrm·d by 
wil'P of tliP <'hild's pn•sPnce "·hen h<' 'ms '.300 feet 
frolll th<· point of impact and in tlw fVel111w11 casP, the 
plaintiff 'rn" :-;itting in an :-;topped lwhind a 
trn('k and hon;;<· tra ilPr wlj('n struck h,\· dt>fend-
ant. wlti('l1 a<'eonling to :-;ome <'\·idPn<'<', dl'f Pndant should 
kn·1· :-Pen i'or a eo11:-;id<·rahl1• <fo.:tanee prior to impaet. 
111 tit<' in:-;tant C'a:-;<', tlwre was no disputP in the facts 
1q11111 wl1ieh ddt>ndant:-; elairnPd plaintiff 'nl:-; contrihn-
111\ il.1 11!'.!.,dig(•Jlt :-;iJH'<' plaintiff adn1itt<'d not sePing ell'-
11 
court to set aside the verdict and grant a new 
trial. 
* * * 
''Consistent with that viewpoint, when the parties 
have had the opportunity of presenting their 
evidence and arguments concerning their disputes 
to the jury, the judgment of the jury should he 
allowed to swing through a wide arc within the 
limits of how reasonable minds might see the 
situation; and thP conrt should not upset a verdict 
mert>ly ht>cans<' it may disagree. If it did so, 
the right of trial by jury would he effectivt>ly 
abrogated and the trial may as ·well he to tlH' 
conrt in tlw first place." 
In the instant casP, thert> is no claim that passion or 
pn·judieP inf! llPlWPd tllP \'Prdict and tlwre is no indica-
tion that tht> jury aekd under a misconception of proven 
fact:-; or misapplied or disregarded the law. To the con-
it appears that the jury ma.\' ha\·e believed the 
rlvfrndant .Johnson acted as a reasonable man in pulling 
linek hPhind plaintiff's automohille after plaintiff applied 
l1is brakes tht> first time, or it may have found the plain-
tiff fail<>d to ht>p a reasonable lookout to the rear and 
tliat if he had done so, he would have seen the defend-
ant':-; lir<'ad truck and con,.:etiuently not have attempted 
to stop sudden].\· when it was atempting to pass. Rather 
than hm·ing disregarded the law, it appears only that the 
jnn may have applit>d the law of contributory negligence 
to tlH; eonduet of the plaintiff. 
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fendant's truck at any time prwr to the accident when 
it was obviously traveling behind him for a distar.·· 
of at least one mile. Therefore, in that n>gard. tlw ju1 
could not have misinterpreted or misapplied the fac!f 
The court instructed the jur)· regarding a forward <lri\ 
er's dnty to keep a reasonable lookont to the rear and((, 
give an appropriate signal of his intention to 8top or 
suddenly decn'asc his speed if there "·as an opportunih 
to do so. Since the jnry apparently applied this la\\, 
how can it he said that it misunderstood or disregarded 
the law? While recognizing that it is difficult to prove 
a negative, defendants most seriously contend that a 
reading of tlw trial transcript of the first trial will not 
off Pnd anyorn"s s0nse of jnstice that a verdict was rrn-
dered in favor of tlw dPfendants, although they i11ay not 
agree with it. 
In Efco Distri/Juting, Jue. ·cs. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 3'i:i. 
412 P.2d G15 (196G) this court affirmed the trial conrt'> 
refusal to grant a ne·w trial where the jm)· foLmd tht 
issnes in favor of the plaintiff bnt awarded no damage·>. 
It stated the rnle \Yhich shonld gon·rn trial conrts in 
a\rnrding a new trial as follows: 
"If it clearly appears that there has been a mis· 
carriage of justice hecanse the jury has refused to 
accept credible, nncontradicte<l P\·idPncP "·Jipn 
tlwre is no rational hasis for rejecting it, or it i> 
plain to he sPPn that the ,jun· has aeted nnder a 
misconception of 1iroven faets, or has misapplied 
or disregarded tl1e law, 01· \\·lwrP it appears that 
tlw V<'rdict \ms the nsnlt of 1iassion and prjndiee. 
it is hoth tl1P pre1·ogatin and tliP dnty of tlll' 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO E;STl\L·r' 
THE JURY THAT NO DAMAGES COULD BE AWARDED M 
COMPENSATION FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE SURGERY. 
During thP Pxamination of Dr. Soderberg, plaintiff', 
eoimsel ask<'d th<• doetor to dPsnilw how a n1ptured di;r 
is repaired. Ddt•ndants ohj<'dt>d nnlPss a fonndatir111 
was laid that snrgery "·as contPrnplat(•d for thP plaintilt 
(R. :3G:.?). ThP C'omt owrrnlPd thP ohjeetion (R :Hi:;! 
and Dr. SoderliPrg d(•:-wribed in so11H' detail 110\Y an in 
cision is made in the front of the m•ek, ho\\" tlH· :-:piw 
is opPnPd up, ho\\" th<' disc material is re1110v<'d and 
finall.'· how bonP is tlH·n taken from tl1<• Jlt>h·ic horn· anil 
placed lwhn'Pn two of tlH=' intt•rnt<'hral ho<liPs of tlit· 
spine (R. 3G:1). Lakr Dr. SodPrlwrg \\·as [ls]ml if lH· liad 
an opinion as to whdliPr or Hot snrgcr:-· would lH' n-
qnired for tlw plaintiff, to which he replit>d: 
"l think tht>n• i :-: a eliancr• that snrg<·r» ,,-i 11 lw 
rn·cpssar)·, hnt it is not lihl:-·. 
Q. How \\"Otild .'·on r·liaradt>riz<· tJiat cliarn l': 
('an :.-ou ascrilw a pen·<•ntage to it? 
A. Yes. f think Larr.'· lias ahout a l;J';>c chanl'e 
o requiring snrg<·r.'·· 'l1!1is is what \\"<:' liave found 
on tht> hasis of studit>s of follo\Ying p<'ople \ritl1 
similar injnriP:-; ov»r a long p<·riod of time. Fil'-
t"<'n p<·n·ent will PY<='ntuall.'· n•qnin· snrµ:nr. 
(R. 368). 
On cross (':\:alllination, Dr. n·adil:· ad!llill1·d 
that tlH· ('Olff<'l'S(' \\"HS t 1"1H', i.(•., tliat tlH·re \\·as (.\]] 
('lianee tlmt s11rg<·r:· \\·ould J1ot l1r• lH'l'<':'"ar:· for tlH· plain-
flf (R. iN±). 
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Plaintiff's counsel then asked what would be required 
iiy \1ay of hospitalization if surgery was required (R. 
:169). ])ef endants again objected to the question since 
there had been no medical evidence introduced by which 
the jury could have found by a preponderance of the evi-
rle1irr that any surgery would be required for the plain-
tiff, but the objection was overruled (R. 370) and the 
1lodor was allowed to state that if surgery was required, 
plaintiff would be hospitalized for a week to ten days and 
\rnnld hP n·qnired to wear a neck brace for a veriod of 
from six wet>ks to three months (R. 370). 
"\ t thP conelusion of the evidence, defendants re-
LJlll'>"lPd that the jnry bi> instructed that they could not 
a\\"anl damages in rnmpensation for any possible future 
(R 211) but said instruction was refused and a 
JH11p<·r Pxception was taken hy defendants (R 499). 
Thi::; eomt revi('\\·pd a very similar ln·oblem in oore 
''· /Je11ccr & Rio Grande lVesfrrn Railu:a.y Company, 
-± l"tah 2d 255, 29:2 J>.2d 849 (195G). ln that case, there 
was 1nedical <'Vidence of JWl"\"P root irritation which was 
eonsistPnt with the Pxistenee of a disc injnry, but the 
lliPclieal (•vid<·nce indieated nothing more than that tlwre 
1rns a tlw plaintiff suffered from a disc 
injnr:i·, sinee this eonrt on re\·ipw observed: 
"Although thP nwdical testimony indicated that 
tlw showPd a npn·e irritation, and that 
:-:11eh were consistPnt with the (•xistence 
of th<' disc injury, WP cannot discover in the wit-
ness(•s' words nothing morP than their corollary 
that, under thP ciremnstanees, a disc mJnry was 
not i111possihle." 
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,·ration the issue of possible future surgery (R. 154). 
, same instruction should have been given in the 
,,ec(in<l trial; and since it was not, the court should have 
O'ranted defendant's motion for a new trial after the jury ,., 
rl'turned a verdict which strongly indicated it had award-
ed general damages for pain and suffering associated 
with possible future surgery. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE 
.JURY'S REVISED VERDICT IN THE SECOND TRIAL. 
The first nrdict returned in the second trial was 
l'learl,\' erroneous since it awarded special damages of 
$10,000 (R. 255-A) "·hen according to the court's instruc-
tions, special damages could not exceed $377.50 (R. 234). 
TIH· comt sent the jury out again to re-deliberate (R. 
.iOS). :Such action was pennissible under Rule 47 ( r), 
U.R.C.P., and Jorgenson vs. Gonzalloes, 14 Utah 2d 330, 
:;1.n P.2d 934 (1963). Howe\·er, the jury did not re-
1/elilwratl', but merely made a mathematical calculation 
as to add to gem•ral damages the amount they eould 
not properly include in special damages. The jury retired 
thP seeond time at 4 :35 p.m. (R. 508) and returned into 
"omt at 4 :41 p.m. (R. 510). Since it always takes two 
or three minutes to }ffOperly assemble the court person-
llP], counsel and the parties aftt>r the jury has infonned 
the hailiff they are ready to return, the jury could have 
nPf·n in session only three or four minutes at most and 
nhvionsly did nothing more than make a mathematical' 
!':dl'ulation to revise the verdict. 
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In the case at bar, there "·as less than the llH'l" 
"corollary" that under the circumstancss future surgPn 
was not impossible. Then• was an 85)'( prnhab1l1ty titat n 
would not be necessary. As stated in the Moore case, 
the total evidence introduced must tend to show a proba 
hility upon which damages may be awarded as opposed 
to mere conjecture. In the instant case, Dr. Soderberg's 
opinion that there was a 15% chance the plaintiff would 
require future surgery was apparently based upon 
the generaliz<'<l obsenation of prior studies of peop](' 
with similar injnries (R. 368). As to whether or not 
plaintiff would fall into the category requiring fntun 
surgery is pure conjecture. In fact, the conjecture \I'll> 
that there is an 85% chance he \Yill not. 
In the Moore ea::w, it was held error not to han 
withdrawn all consideration of a ruptured disc from tlir 
jury. ·whereas in the instant case, defendants requested 
only that the jury he instructed that it could not award 
damages as compensation for the expenses or disability 
associated with possible future surgery. As in the Moore 
ea::;e, there is a strong indication that the jury mrnrdP<l 
damages for the consequences of future pain and suffering 
associated with cervical fusion operation, since theY 
a\rnrdPd general damages of $11,:122.50 (R. :255-A), which 
would hP an unusually high m\·ard of gen<>ral damagP> 
when ::;pecial damages amonnted to only $377.50 and no 
sllrg<>ry had heen pt>rfornwd to datt•. 
Upon tlw ::;amp me<lieal eYi<lencP n•ceiyed in th<· first 
trial ( R. 62:5-63'.2), the trial eonrt gave defendant n-
q1wst<'fl instrllction taking from th<> ('Onsid-
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The fact that the judy did not re-deliberate as 
instructed (R. 508), as evidenced by its return ,,·iH1ii1 
six minutes, is evidence of misconduct and 
in refusing to follow the court's instrutions. In Fcrn1 __ ,; 
vs. City of Pitt::-;lrnrgh, 145 A.2d 70G (Penn. 1958), aft("!' 
one hour and 40 minutes of deliberation, the jury n·turneJ 
a verdict of $15,000 plu:-; medical e-xpenses and "all conrt 
cost:-; and attorne:;'s ft'es.'' 'l'lte trial judge irn.;trnded 
the jur)· that the>· could not includ(' in their wrdict at-
torney's fees and court costs. The jury thereupon re-
tired and five minutes latt>r returned a verdict of $25,0IJIJ 
again:-;t tlw defendants. On appeal, the Pmnsylrnnia 
Court ltPld: 
"The jur:,':-; verdict, fi1·c mi111tfes {([fer_. of $:.!:i,OfllJ 
1rn:-; a paknt method of adding ft•1·' 
and conrt costs b>· indin·ction and was 
capricious, PXC<'ssiv<' and nnjnstifiahle." (E11q1!1n-
sis supplied hy court). 
ThP juggling of amounts lH'tween special and 
general damage::; as a snh::;titute for n•-dt>lilwration l1as 
also been held to constitute misconduct of the jury. In 
Hall rs. Cornett, 240 P.2d 231 (On•. 197il), tlw 
fin;t v<:•rdict for the plaintiff was in the :-;nm of $1,0(Hi.-tU 
special damag<'s and $1.00 genpral damages. The trial 
court cmrnickred the $1.00 general damag\'s award a' 
inadequate under tl1<' circrnn:-;tane1·s and se11t the jm:1 
lmck ont to re-delihPrate. T!te jnry thPn n•turned a s1·c01Hl 
wrdict of $:300.00 gern·ral damagPs and $707.40 s1 H'eial 
damages, reaehing t!H' same total amount. 'L'he trial 
eonrt set m;idP sP<·ond \'Ndict and grnntecl H m·11 
trial. such action on a]JJJ<'al, tl1e {)rpg11n 
Nnpreme Court held: 
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"\Ve turn to the St'cond assignment of error which 
relates to st>tting aside the second wrdict and 
µ;ranting a new trial. In returning that verdict, 
tlH' jury was guilty of misconduct. The record 
(•ondnsin,ly shows that they merely juggled the 
fih'lll'PS whieh they had adopted in their first abor-
tive verdict." 
'l'hat is exactly what was done in the incident case, 
the jury m(•rcly deducted $9,622.50 from the special 
damages award of the first verdict and added it to the 
:H,100.00 general damages award, making a general 
damag·es award of $11,322.50 in the second verdict. The 
total award of $11, 700.00 in the second verdict is the 
-;ame total sum awarded in the first verdict. Consequent-
!;·. it i" clear there was no re-deliberation as ordered by 
the l'onrt hut merely a mathematical juggling of the first 
n·rdid. 
Rimilarly, rn Fla11sberg rs. Paulson, 399 P.2d 356 
( UrP. 196-1) it was held to be grounds for a mis-
trial whPn· the jnr:< was returned to correct an erroneous 
,·,·rdi('t which awarded only special damages and the 
:>econd Vt'l'dict Illt'l'Ply transferred all the SlH'Cials to 
t!Yrn·ral darnaµ;Ps. The eonrt eonsidt>red this a "stubhorn 
afilwn•nee to an invalid verdict'' and the refusal to follow 
thP trial court's instnwtions was grounds for a mistrial. 
Abo, the increase in the general damage figure was 
l'il'n rly exeessi ,.e in view of the original general damage 
figme. Plaintiff attempted to justify the increase in the 
:.;t·nPrul damage award by submitting affidavits of jurors 
to the ronrt in adYanee of the hearing of def end ant's mo-
ti1111 for a 11ew trial which preyentecl the court ruling upon 
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their admissibility before they were made part of thr 
record of this action. (R. 261-266). Such procedure was 
highly improper and may have been prejudicial to tbe 
defendant's position in their motion for a new trial. The 
principle prohibiting such conduct and procedure is set 
forth in Wheat vs. Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
way Comparny, 120 Utah 418, 250 P.2d 932 (1952) as 
follows: 
"The rnle prohibiting jurors from impeaching 
their verdict is founded on sound reasoning and 
has long been recognized. In People v1;. Flynn, 
we said: 
'It is well Sl;ttled that affidavits of juron 
will not be received to impeach or question 
their verdict, nor to show the grounds upon 
which it was rendered, nor to show their mis-
understanding of fact or law, nor that they 
misunderstood the charge of the court, or the 
effect of their verdict, nor their opiniom. 
surmises, and processes of reasoning in arriY-
ing at a wrdict.' 
The policy behind this statement applies ,\·ith 
Pqnal cogency to the oral e\·idence of jurors prof-
fered u1)0n a hearing of a motion for a new triaL 
To permit litigants to get ;jurors to sign affidavit' 
or testify to matters discussed in connection with 
tli<'ir funetions as jurors 'rnnld open the door to 
inquin· into all matter of things which a losing 
litigant might consider improper: misconceptions 
of evidrnce or law, offers of settlement, personal 
experiences, prejn<lice against litigants or their 
causes or the classes to which the,· helong. It 
would he an intPnninable and totally impradiea1 
process. Such post-mortems would hP prodnrtiw 




'l'he verdict of no cause of action returned in the first 
tri. 1 was supported by substantial evidence and nothing 
appPars in the record to indicate that the jury either dis-
regardt>d uncontroverted evidence or misapplied the law 
so as to cause a misearriage of justice; and in the ab-
sencP of such a showing, it was an abuse of discretion for 
the trial court to set the nrdict aside and award a new 
trial. 
Defendants were prejudice in the st>cond trial in the 
following particulars: (l) by the court allowing the jury 
to consider as an elenwnt of damages the consequences 
of possible futnre surg<'ry when no medical testimony had 
been introduced from whi<'h the jury could have found 
by a preponderance of tlw evidence that future surgery 
\\'onld be necessary, (2) by the jury's failure to abide 
hy the court's instrnctions in awarding special damages 
in it;; first wrdict, (3) by the misconduct of the jury 
in failing to re-deliberate and merely juggling amounts 
hetwet>n special damagt>s and gent>ral damages in return-
ing its second verdict, and (-!:) by the misconduct of op-
posing coumwl in filing affidavits of jurors in the record 
hefore the admissibility of such could be ruled upon by 
the trial court at the hearing of defendants' motion for 
a nPw trial. 
WHEREFORE, appellants and defendants below 
pray that the judgment of the trial court in favor of the 
plaintiff be reversed and that the judgment of no cause 
of action Pntered on the first jury verdict be reinstated; 
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or in the alternative, that defendants be awarded a new 
trial in the consequence of the prejudicial :>rro1 -:0Jt1- , 
I mitted in the second trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
H. Vvayne Wadsworth 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
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